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NORTHwEsTERN UNIvErrY SCHOOL OF LAw
DONALD G. BAIRD, EDITOR
SUSPENDED SENTENCE-"ACCRUAL" OF APPEAL
ON REVOCATION [TEXAS]
In 1935 appellant was convicted of cattle
theft, and the sentence was suspended in
accordance with a Texas statute., Two and
a half years later he was convicted of driv-
ing while intoxicated, whereupon the trial
judge in the first case revoked the suspen-
sion and pronounced sentence. The second
conviction was affirmed on appeal,2 and
the two sentences were to be served con-
secutively. Meanwhile the court reporter's
notes and transcript of testimony in the
first trial had been destroyed, one of the
attorneys had died, and the parties could
not agree on a statement of facts from
memory. On appeal as to the merits of
the first conviction it was held that, since
there was no adequate record for review,
the judgment should be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.3
The holding is based on two rules of
criminal procedure which appear to be
well-settled in the Texas decisions. The
SVernon's Texas Statutes, Code Crim. Proc.(1936) Art. 776, 776a, 778, 779.
2 Lamkin v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. Rep. 99, 123
S.W. (2d) 662 (1939).
. 3 Lainkin v. State, 136 S.W. (2d) 225 (Tex.
Crim. Rep. 1940).
4 Bierman v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. Rep. 284, 164
S.W. 840 (1914); Gallier v. State, 78 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 534, 182 S.W. 306 (1916); Thomas v. State
87 Tex. Crim. Rep. 153, 219 S.W. 1100 (1920).
5 Bierman v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. Rep. 284, 164
S.W. 840 (1914); Ex Parte Beland, 94 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 614, 252 S.W. 529 (1923).
6 17 C. J. Criminal Law §3292; United States v.
Lecato, 29 F. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 2d, 1928); Birnbaum
v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 885 (C.C.A. 4th, 1939);
Barnes v. State, 20 Ariz. 183, 178 Pac. 780 (1919);
People v. Von Eckartsberg, 133 Cal. App. 1, 23
P. (2d) 819 (1933); Symington v. State, 133 Md.
452, 105 Atl. 541 (1919); State v. Bongiorno, 96
N. J. Law 318, 115 At!. 665 (1921).
first of these is that there can be no appeal
from a suspended sentence, since such does
not constitute a "final judgment."4 The sec-
ond is that the right of appeal accrues if
and when the suspension is revoked and
final sentence and judgment pronounced.5
There is a very general agreement with
the first point 6 However, afew jurisdictions
have held to the contrary, 7 and some states
have statutes expressly providing for ap-
peal from suspended sentences.8 In Penn-
sylvania several decisions, while recogni-
zing the rule as prevailing in that state,
have refused to follow it in certain situa-
tions, in order to prevent manifest injus-
tice to the convicted appellants.0 Under
the Federal Probation Act", a distinction
is drawn between suspending pronounce-
ment of sentence and suspending execu-
tion thereof. Either order may be given,
in the discretion of the trial judge, but only
from the latter may the case be appealed
7Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939);
Sutton v. State, 194 Ind. 479, 143 N.E. 353 (1924)
(overruling prior cases); State v. Liliopolous, 165
Wash. 197, 5 P. (2d) 319 (1931).
s Thompson's Laws of New York (1939), Code
Crim. Proc. 517, 750.
9 Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa. 555, 167 Ati.
333 (1933) (abuse of judicial discretion); Common-
wealth v. Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 Atl. 454 (1935)
(defendant admittedly insane; conVicted of mur-
der); Commonwealth v. Haines, 130 Pa. Super.
193, 196 AtL 621 (1938) (insufficient evidence).
In the Trunk case, supra, severe sentences were
imposed on two counts of the indictment, but
sentence was suspended on the other counts.
Flagrantly biased instructions as to the latter
counts apparently influenced the trial and ver-
dict as a whole. By the rule under discussion
these instructions would not be open to review.
10 43 Stat. 1259 (1925), 18 U.S.CA. 724 (1927).
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on the merits."1 In at least one state it has
been held that an order denying a motion
for new trial will serve as the basis for an
appeal, even though the sentence is sus-
pended.'2
In regard to the second point involved
in the present case-the accrual of the
right of appeal upon revocation of sus-
pension-the weight of-authority appears
to be contrary to the Texas decision.' 3 The
result is that in many jurisdictions sus-
pension of sentence removes all opportun-
ity for appeal, unless before the time limit
on appeals expires the defendant demands
that sentence be pronounced. If he does
not, he is deemed to have waived all rights
to appeal.14
There are obvious disadvantages in al-
lowing an appeal and a new trial years after
conviction, as was done in the case under
discussion.'5 While this procedure may
well be preferable to a complete denial of
appeal, it appears to violate the well-estab-
lished policy underlying statutory time
limits on appeals. But such a result would
be unnecessary were it not for the first
premise in the case, that an appeal will be
11 Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937);
Birnbaum v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 885
(C.C.A. 4th, 1939).
12 People v. Hartman, 23 Cal. App. 72, 137 Pac.
611 (1914).
13 Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P. (2d) 498
(1938); Sutton v. State, 194 Ind. 479, 143 N.E. 353(1924); Renado v. Lummus, 205 Mass. 155, 91 NY.
144 (1910).
14 "The petitioner having waived his right of
appeal, and having . . . accepted a different
provision for his benefit, his claim of an appeal
. . . came too late." Renado v. Lummus, 205
Mass. 155, 157, 91 N.E. 144, 145 (1910). In regard
to revocation of a suspended sentence, it is gen-
erally provided by statute that this must be
within the period for which the defendant might
have been sentenced. Commonwealth ex rel.
Wilhelm v. Morgan, 278 Pa. 395, 123 AtL 337 (1924).
It has been held in some cases, however, that
revocation and the imposition of sentence may
come at any time. State ex rel. Tingstad v.
Starwich, 119 Wash. 561, 206 Pac. 29 (1922). Under
this rule a defendant may have a life-long threat
of incarceration hanging over his head.
15 Witnesses may die or move away, records
may be destroyed, and evidence lost. See Brooks
v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P. (2d) 498 (1938). The
present case well illustrates some of the diffi-
culties.
1e It should be noted that the term "final judg-
ment' has no set meaning, and in fact varies
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denied from a suspended sentence. This
rule seems more technical than logical and
is difficult to justify. The cases supporting
it generally state that the only final ap-
pealable judgment in a criminal case is
the pronouncement of sentence. But an
order adjudging the accused guilty and
suspending sentence terminates the prose-
cution and the proceedings of the trial. For
the purpose of appeal this should satisfy
any sound criterion for final judgment 16
In passing it may be added that a defend-
ant's conviction is only too "final" if he
cannot obtain review.
The cases denying an appeal sometimes
state the rule in terms of estoppel.1' It- is
considered unbecoming of a defendant to
question the fairness of his trial when he
has received the benefits of a suspension
of sentence. This argument assumes that
no injury is suffered so long as actual im-
prisonment is stayed. 8 But it should be
remembered that in all these cases a per-
son has been indicted, tried, and found
guilty. Certain privileges may thus be lost.
In State v. Liliopolous 9 the defendant at-
widely in regard to different purposes. United
States ex rel. Voorhees v. Hill, 6 F. Supp. 922
(M.D. Penn. 1934) (suspended sentence is final
judgment as to liquor-law violators on probation
at the time of Repeal); noted in 3 Geo. Wash.
L.R. 247 (1935); see Words and Phrases, perm.
edit. (1940) "Final judgment or order."
17 "Accepting the benefits of probation, there-
fore, . . . estops him from bringing the errors
committed at the trial to this court for review.
. . . He cannot 'eat his cake and have it too'."
Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 551; 78 P. (2d) 498,
501 (1938).
is "A defendant may at any time insist upon
the imposition of sentence, if so minded, and if
he prefers to remain under probation rather than
to take his chances, no grave evil results."
United States v. Lecato. 29 F. (2d) 694, 695
(C.C.A. 2d, 1928).
19 165 Wash. 197, 5 P. (2d) 319 (1931). Wash-
ington is one of the states allowing an appeal
from a suspended sentence. In Ne v York such
an appeal may be taken from certain courts.
Seb note 8, supra. Under the New York pro-
cedure innocent persons have been enabled to
clear their names of conviction. People v.
Magnus, 155 N.Y.S. 1013 (1915) (epileptic de-
fendant; medical testimony ignored in the trial
court); People v. Albo, 250 N.Y.S. 167 (1931)
(conviction unsupported by evidence). See note
9. supra.
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torney had been convicted of embezzle-
ment, which meant that the loss, by dis-
barment, of his means of livelihood was
imminent. There is an attendant stigma.
Few persons are so situated socially that
conviction of felony works no injury. And
an innocent party faces a hard choice when
he must either forego the opportunity for
full vindication, or else demand imposi-
tion of sentence and take the risk of an
unsuccessful appeal.
STEPmEN LADD.
CONTRACEPTIVES-PRESCRIPTION BY A PHYSICIAN
AS A HEALTH MEASURE [CONNECTICUT]*
The defendant, a licensed physician,
prescribed the use of contraceptives for a
married woman for the preservation of her
general health and was convicted under
section 6246' of the Connecticut General
Statutes which places an absolute prohi-
bition upon the use of contraceptives. On
appeal the defendant contended that the
statute should be construed so as to permit
an exception where a physician prescribes
the use of contraceptives to preserve life
or protect the general health and well being
of a married woman, and that construed
without such an implied exception the
statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court of Errors, however, affirmed the
conviction holding no exception could be
* State v. Nelson, 11 A. (2d) 856 (Conn. 1940).
'Section 6246 (1930) "Use of drugs or instru-
ments to prevent conception. Any person who
shall use any drug, medical article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned
not'less than sixty days nor more than one year
or both fined and imprisoned."
Section 6562 (1930) "Accessories. Any person
who shall assist, abet, counsel, cause, hire or
command another to commit any offense may
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
offender."
2 19 Stat. 90 (1876), 18 USCA 334 (1927). This
act places an unconditional prohibition upon
mailing or .importing of articles "designed,
adapted or intended for the prevention of con-
ception or the procurement of a miscarriage."
See Broun and Leech, Anthony Comstock (1927)
for the influence the author of the bill had upon
its passage.
3 States having absolute prohibitions similar
to Connecticut are Kansas, Rev. Stat. c. 21 §1101(1935); Mississippi, Miss. Code Anno. §1057 (1930);
Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. §4275 (1929); Pennsyl-
vania, 18 Pa. Anno. Stat. §§777, 778 (Purdon
implied, and that the statute without the
exception was unconstitutional.
The legislative history of this subject
begins with the passage of the Comstock
Act 2 by Congress in 1873. This act was
immediately copied by a number of state
legislatures whose enactments,3 of which
the Connecticut statute involved is one,
were absolute in scope admitting of no
exceptions. Although there is considerable
authority to support the constitutionality
of these statutes when strictly construed
as being within state police powers,4 there
is some ground upon which a-finding of un-
constitutionality could be based. In Lam-
bert v. Yeflowley 5 Mr."-Justice Brandeis
intimated that the provision in the National
1930); Washington, Wash Comp. Stat. §2460(1932). See Dennett, Birth Control Laws (1926).
Subsequent Federal statutes are also absolute
in form, Transportation in interstate commerce
29 stat. 512 (1897), 18 USCA §396 (1927); Prohibi-
tion on importation of articles for the prevention
of conception 46 Stat. 688 (1930). 19 USCA §1305a(1935).
4 Decisions sustaining their constitutionality
are Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N. E. (2d) 222(Mass. 1938); Commonwealth v. Allison, 227
Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917); People v. Byrne,
163 N.Y. Supp. 682 (1916); State v. Arnold, 217
Wis. 340, 258 N.W. 843 (1935). The statute in the
latter case allowed sale by registered pharmacist
or duly licensed physician.
Commonwealth v. Gardner, supra, commented
on in 37 Mich. Law Rev. 317 (1938) and 7 Geo.
Wash. Law Rev. 255 (1938) interpreting a statute
very similar to the Connecticut statute held that
the wording was unequivocal and admitted of no
implied exception in favor of physicians and
that an absolute prohibition was constitutional
under the police power of the legislature. Also
see Comment (1939) 6 U. Chi. Law Rev. 260.
5 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
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Prohibition Act limiting the prescription of
alcoholic liquors for medicinal purposes
would have been unconstitutional had
physicians been in agreement as to the
medicinal values of such liquors.6 A simi-
lar indication, was given in a somewhat
earlier decision, Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts7 where it was said, in -a very strong
dicta, that a compulsory vaccination stat-
ute comprehending all adults in its scope
could not be applied against a person who
could show with reasonable certainty that
he was not at the time a fit subject for
vaccination. Consequently upon a demon-
stration of the general recognition of the-
medicinal value of contraceptives by the
medical profession in addition to a showing
that their denial would cause a specific and
predictable physical injury, these cases
would lend considerable weight to a deci-
sion that the statute was unconstitutional.
However, the statute could be saved by
a construction which would admit of ex-
ceptions where a married woman's health,
or life was threatened by a specific danger
through pregnancy. In the absence of an
express declaration by the legislature that
no exceptions were to be implied this would
be possible," especially in view of the fact
that there is a considerable body of prece-
dent in support of such a construction. In
the face of the absolute Federal statutes
G Id. 294. The court speaking with approval of
the decision in Everards Breweries v. Day, 265
U.S. 545 (1924), said "that Congress must be re-
garded as having concluded--as well it might do
in the absence of any consensus of opinion among
physicians and in the presence of the absolute
prohibition in many of the states-that malt
liquor has no substantial medicinal qualities
making its prescription necessary; and that this
made it impossible to say that the provision was
an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of
power."
7 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
8 From 1923 to 1935 the Connecticut legislature
repeatedly rejected an amendment to the statute
which would expressly permit physicians to
prescribe the use of contraceptives when in their
opinion pregnancy would be detrimental to the
health of such patient or to the child of such
patient This is strongly persuasive of the intent
of the legislature. The federal courts, however,
inferred the exception in the Comstock Act al-
though the words "except on a prescription of
a physician in good standing, given in good
faith" were struck out of the original bill before
it was passed by Congress.
936 F. (2d) 737 (C.C.A. 2d. 1936). Judge
the Circuit Court of Appeals in many de-
cisions has found implied exceptions to the
operation of these laws. In United States
v. de Package9 Judge Augustus Hand
holding that the statute ° did not bar im-
portation of contraceptives by physicians
to protect a patient's health or for experi-
mental purposes, said "the statute ....
embraces only such articles as congress
would have denounced as immoral if it had
understood all the conditions under which
they were to be used, and was not designed
to prevent importation of things which
might intelligently be employed to save
life or promote the well being of patients.""
Similarly in Youngs Rubber Co. v. Lee"2
the court indicated that an absolute pro-
hibition on the use of the mails for trans-
porting articles of contraception did not
apply where such objects also had a legiti-
mate use. In Bours v. United States 3 a
prohibition on the'mailing of information
as to where operations producing abor-
tions would be performed which' applied to
all abortions by its terms, was held never-
theless not to prevent a physician from us-
ing the mails to say that if an examination
showed the necessity of an operation to
save life he would operate. Corresponding
positions have been taken in United States
v. Dennett" and United States v. One Book
Called Ulysses45 concerning obscenity.
Learned Hand, although concurring on other
grounds, said, "... . there seems to me substan-
tial reason for saying that contraceptives were
meant to be forbidden whether or not prescribed
by physicians, and that no lawful use of them
was contemplated."
1046 Stat 688 (1930), 19 USCA §1305a (1935).
- 86 F. (2d) 737, 739 (C.C.A. 2d. 1936).
12 45 F. (2d) 103 (C.C.A. 2d. 1930).
'3 229 Fed. 960 (C.C.A. 7th. 1915).
14 39 F. (2d) 564 (C.C.A. 2d. 1930).
1s72 F. (2d) 705 (C.C.AL 2d. 1934). In this
decision Judge Augustus Hand held that the
Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 USCA
§1305a (1935), containing a prohibition on impor-
tation of obscene books except classics or books
of recognized and establisked literary or scien-
tific merit which may be admitted at the discre-
tion of the Secretary of the Treasury but only
when imported for non-commercial purposes did
not exclude a publication which was sincere and
in which the erotic matter was not introduced to
promote lust and does not furnish the dominant
note of the publication. Similarly United States
v. One Book Entitled Married Love, 48 F. (2d)
821 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book
Contraception, 51 F. (2d) 525 (S.. N.Y. 1931).
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However, because exceptions may be im-
plied to statutes that are absolute in form
does not give the' courts license to imply
any exception they desire; the statutes
must be interpreted in a manner not incon-
sistent with the reasonable legislative in-
tent Nevertheless it is difficult to see how
Jhe court could validly object to an excep-
tion permitting a physician to prescribe
contraceptives where pregnancy would
acutely jeopardize life, for to do so would
result in the absurd situation where a mar-
ried woman in ill health could not legally
resort to the use of contraceptives but upon
becoming pregnant could legally submit to
an abortion if it were necessary to save her
life.16 It is difficult to believe that the legis-
lature intended such an anomalous situa-
tion. The court in the instant case seem-
ingly sensed this inconsistency for it con-
fined the issue to situations where in the
opinion of the physician the "general
health" of a woman required that she not
bear children and it refused to determine
whether an implied exception might be
recognized when pregnancy would jeopard-
ize life." But even on the assumption that
in the above case the court would logically
be impelled to find an implied exception, we
still have the inequitable situation that a
woman threatened with life long invalid-
ism were she to bear a child, could not le-
gally use contraceptives. Generally, in the
past, courts have refused to find an ex-
ception to the abortion statutes unless the
operation was necessary to save life.'8 The
position of the court in the instant case
would be conditioned by the precedents of
the abortion cases. But harm suffered as
a consequence of pregnancy may range
from permanent physical invaldism to the
disturbance of the psychological equilib-
rium and to create exceptions only in
cases where life itself is endangered seems
inequitable. This has been recognized in
a recent English case, Rex v. Bourne,19
where it was held that the necessity to
prevent a woman from becoming a "phys-
ical and mental wreck" was a good defense
to a prosecution under the abortion stat-
ute. Therefore it would seem that to imply
an exception in a fact situation where it
was necessary to avoid a specific danger
to health, 20 although the danger might hot
necessarily jeopardize life, would be a
judicial interpretation entirely consonant
with legislative intent, past decisions and
the equities of the situation. Further than
this the court could scarcely go without
clear legilative consent.21
DA=nIL HANscOw.
INDICTMENTS-DUPLICITY-CHARGING IN THE ALTERNATIVE
IN THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE [DELAWARE]
In State v. Morrow' the defendant was
indicted for the unlawful practice of medi-
cine without a license. The Delaware
statute2 defines the practice of medicine as
"to investigate or diagnosticate, or to offer
to investigate any physical or mental ail-
16 Section 6056 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) express-
ly provided an exception to the blanket prohibi-
tion against abortions where such abortions are
necessarSj to save life.
"7 11 A. (2d)-856, 859 (1940).
18 See Note (1938) U. Chi. Law Rev. 109, 110.
19 119381 3 All E.R. 615, [1939] 1 K.B. 87, 108
L. J. K. B. 471.
20 Davis, Gynecology and Obstetrics, C. 5 p. 36,
C. 9 p. 12, 20 (1935).
21 For further discussion see Note (1940) 19
Neb. Law Rev. 35; Note (1932) 45 Harv. Law
ment, or disease of any person, or to give
surgical assistance to, or suggest, recom-
mend, prescribe or direct for the use of any
person, any drug, medicine, appliance or
other agency," or the doing of other similar
acts. The second count of the indictment s
Rev. 723.
110 A. (2d) 530 (Delaware, decided Nov. 14,
1939).
2 Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 27 §926.
3 The first count of the indictment charging
only that the defendant "did unlawfully engage
in the practice of medicine without proper
license" was dismissed because not enough facts
were stated to sufficiently inform the defendant
of the charges he would have to meet at the
trial.
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charged the defendant with the doing of
several of these acts set out in the stat-
ute, connecting them with the word and in
place of the word or used in the statute.
The defendant claimed the count was bad
because it was duplicitous in alleging sev-
eral distinct offenses in one count, and be-
cause it was misleading in that it did not
specifically inform the defendant of the
violation of the law against which he must
defend. The court, however, held this count
was not duplicitious since the several acts
charged were connected with the same
general offense and subject to the same
measure and kind of punishment; and that
the wording of the indictment was suffici-
ently clear to inform the accused of the
crime with which he was charged.
The holding in the instant case on the
point of duplicity follows the generally ac-
cepted rule that where a statute creates
one offense but specifies several ways or
means by which it may be committed, the
indictment may charge conjunctively in a
single count the doing of any or all of these
acts, i.e. a single offense may be described
by alleging severalof these acts in one count
although each one alleged separately would
have been sufficient to describe it. The
courts hold further that when several of
the acts are charged only one need be
proved to establish the crime.' They how-
ever seem to differ on when the acts al-
leged describe a single offense and when
they go to make up separate offenses.
While they seem to agree that all the acts
41 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (4th ed.,
1895) §§434, 436; 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure(9th ed.. 1918) §300; 27 Am. Jur., Indictments and
Informations §§124, 104.
5 Cruel v. United States, 21 F. (2d) 690 (C.C-.A
8th, 1927), discussed in 37 Yale Law J. 522 (1927);
Leach v. State. 86 P. (2d) 1013 (Okla., 1939) (the
information charged that the defendant did "sell,
bai7ter, give and otherwise furnish whiskey" to
a minor-held bad as duplicitous); State v.
Haven, 57 Vt. 399. 9 At. 841 (1887) (false certifi-
cate "issued and used"--held to be bad for
duplicity); State v. McCormack, 56 Iowa 585,
9 N.W. 916 (1881) ("forging and uttering forged
paper" held separate offenses).
r Supra note 4. For more recent cases see
State v. Carr, 151 Kan. 36, 98 P. (2d) 36 (1940);
Jackson v. State, 5 A (2d) 282 (Md. 1939); State
must arise out of a single transaction they
differ as to just exactly what a single trans-
action is; some give it a comparatively nar-
row meaning s while others allow a wider
scope than the word would seem to imply.6
However, these decision lines have never
been clearly drawn so it is usually left to
the discretion of the judge to determine
whether the different acts alleged go to
make up the gist of one offense or several
separate and distinct offenses. By the use
of this discretion the judges have been able
to limit the formal rule of duplicity. In
some states the legislatures have gone fur-
ther and have by statute" practically done
away with duplicity by specifically pro-
viding that what previously required sev-
eral counts might be accomplished in a
single count unless the defendant was prej-
udiced thereby.
7
While the general rule is that the sev-
eral acts specified in a statute may be
charged conjunctively in the same count
it seems to be equally well settled that-a
count charging a series of acts disjunc-
tively in the exact words of the statute
would be held bad for uncertainty-that
by the use of the word or instead of the
word anad the defendant would not know
with which of the acts or offenses he was
charged and would not be able to prepare
his defense accordingly.8 "Thus in Angels
Case, 2 Va. Cases 231, it was held that
where the statute said 'whoever shall un-
lawfully shoot or stab another with inten-
tion to maim, disfigure, disable or kill shall
v. Rooney, 97 P. (2d) 156 (Wash. 1939).
7 Minnesota, Mason's Minn. Stat (1927) §10648;
Montana, Rev. Code of Mont. (1935) §11853;
Nevada, Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) §10858; Okla-
home, Okla. Stat. (1931) §2892; Texas, Vernon's
Tex. Stat (1936) Code of Crim. Proc. art. 412;
Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws of Fla., Supp. (1940)
§866 (131); Hawaii, Rev. Laws of Hawaii (1935)
§5506; Louisiana, La. Code of Crim. Proc. (1932)
§252; Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §28.1015;
New Hampshire, Pub. Laws of N. H. (1926) c.
368 §12.
81 Bishop, New Crindnal Procedure (4th ed.
1895) §586. 436: 27 Am. Jur., Indictments and
Informations §§104, 124: Annotation 51 I.R.A.
(ns.) 134. See also Note (1935), 8 Australian
Law J. 430, 432. 433. For Nebraska law see Note
(1933), 11 Neb. L. BuL 458.
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
be,' etc., the indictment was properly drawn
which charged the act done 'with in-
tention to maim, disfigure, disable and
kill' and that the party on such an indict-
ment should be found guilty if his intention
was only to maim and disfigure and not
to kill. If this indictment had followed the
words of the statute, it would have been
bad for it would have violated the well
established rule that an indictment must
not state the offense disjunctively when it
is thereby left uncertain what is really in-
tended to be relied on as the accusation."'
The folly of such a rule seems to be obvious
on the face of it. In one breath the Courts
say it is good pleading to use and instead
of or but still give and the meaning of or
by allowing any one of the acts to prove the
offense, and in another breath they say the
use of the disjunctive makes the count bad.
How can it be said that the use of the con-
junctive better and more certainly informs
the accused of the charges against him
when it is in reality given the exact mean-
ing of the disjunctive. For example, using
the statute in the instant case, how would
the defendant to be less informed of the
charges which he must defend if the in-
dictment read that the defendant "did in-
vestigate or did diagnosticate, or did pre-
scribe certain drugs" than if it read "did
investigate and did diagnosticate and did
prescribe"? In the first case it would be
9 State v. Charlton, 11 W. Va. 333, 334 (18T).
10 1 Chitty, Criminal Law (1819) §336.
11 State v. George, 134 La. 177, 63 So. 866 (1913).
See Bishop, New Criminal Procedure §590; 51
L.R.A. (ns) 133.
12 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure §592.
23 Millar, The Reform of Criminal Pleading in
Illinois (1917) 8 J. Crim. L. 337; Millar, The
Function of Criminal Pleading (1921) 12 J. Crim.
claimed that the defendant would not know
which of the three acts he was accused of
and therefore the count would be uncer-
tain, but why could he not prepare a de-
fense for the three acts the same as in the
case when the conjunctive is used? There
would be some sense to the rule, other than
common law of formality,10 if the and were
used in its strict sense and every act in the
series had to be proved in order to con-
stitute the offense; but such is not the case
and any one of the acts by itself may con-
stitute the entire offense, thus giving ex-
actly the same result as if the disjunctive
were used. The few cases in which the
disjunctive is allowed are generally those
in which the words or phrases so connected
are practically synonymous as "spiritous
or intoxicating" liquor." Occassionally also
the court may hold the alternative part as
surplusage.1
2
Then, since the defendant would be fully
informed of the crime with which he was
charged under either the disjunctive or
the conjunctive and since the rule is now
illogical and impractical and only a rem-
nant of common law formality it should be
done away with."3 Some states by statute
have done this by providing that offenses of
the same character and subject to the same
punishment may be charged alternatively
in the same count. 4
RicnaRD J. FiNx.
L. 500.
14Alabama, Ala. Code Ann. (1928) §4546; Ari-
zona, Ariz. Code (1928) §4980; Kentucky, Carroll's
Ky. Code of Prac. in Crim. Cases (1938) §126;
New Mexico, N. M. Stat. Ann. (1929) §4409; Okla-
homa, Okla. Stat. (1931) §2886; Oregon, Ore. Code
Ann. (1930) §13-708; Tennessee, William's Tenn.
Code Ann. (1934) §11628; Utah, Rev. Stat. of Utah
(1933) §105-21-7.
